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New Zealand’s Electoral Act 1956, and in particular the entrenched (or “reserved”) provisions 
it introduced into the country’s legal framework, has long represented something of a 
constitutional oddity. In reserving certain key aspects of our electoral process, the 1956 Act 
purported to stop future Parliaments from altering these except by following a particular, and 
more demanding, process of enactment. In a nutshell, it sought to subject the will of future 
elected members of Parliament to that of the MPs of 1956, insofar as future representatives 
could only change the law if they followed the “manner and form” their forebears demanded. 
These reserved aspects are the length of the term of Parliament; the make-up of the 
Representation Commission (which determines the boundaries of electoral districts); the way 
in which electoral districts are to be drawn up; the age at which people may vote; and the 
method by which votes are cast. That presumption then colours a significant feature of New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements; that its Parliament is a fully sovereign lawmaking body, 
able to make (or unmake) any law on any subject it chooses. 
 
Considered significant enough to be described, by Keith Scott in 1962, as the nearest thing that 
New Zealand has to a written constitution, the advent of MMP in 1993 then largely occluded 
the 1956 legislation’s importance. After all, the law of 1956 was entirely premised on the idea 
of individual candidates, supported by two major political parties, battling for election in 
separate constituencies with the goal of becoming part of a single party majority government. 
Once a new proportional voting system was in place, heralding an era of multi-party 
government in which nationwide votes for political parties qua parties is the dominant 
determinant of representation, the earlier legislation’s reserved provisions appeared 
preoccupied with matters now somewhat peripheral to the nation’s political life. So, although 
the reserved provisions were carried forward into the new Electoral Act 1993, they sat in 
relative obscurity towards that legislation’s end, only noted in passing in discussions of the 
nation’s electoral rules. For example, my own text on New Zealand’s electoral law devotes less 
than two pages to discussing the reserved provisions. 
 
Two recent events, however, have refocused attention on the significance of what occurred in 
1956. The first was a series of legal challenges brought by a serving prisoner, Arthur Taylor, 
to 2010 legislation that stripped the right to vote from all serving prisoners.1 Amidst these 
challenges was a claim that the prisoner voting ban’s passage through parliament failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements first introduced back in 1956, and so is invalid law. 
While that challenge ultimately failed because the legislative ban in question did not involve 
any change to a reserved provision, it attracted the sustained attention of New Zealand’s 
Supreme Court (Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 123). This represents the first time 
that the nation’s judiciary has been called upon to consider directly how the reserved provisions 
apply within our legal framework. 
 
The second event is the publication of Elizabeth McLeay’s excellent revisiting of the history 
and significance of the 1956 legislation, In Search of Consensus: New Zealand’s Electoral Act 
1956 and its Constitutional Legacy. In an admirably manageable 180 pages, McLeay explores 
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not only what the Electoral Act 1956 set out to do and how its goals continue to reverberate in 
our constitutional arrangements, but also what led the political actors of that era to engage in 
this legislative experiment. She situates the development in the context of both the 
contemporary constitutional understandings of those responsible for drafting the new law and 
the political disputes that gave rise to a felt need to protect certain aspects of the election 
process from partisan manipulation. At the risk of oversimplifying what McLeay reveals to be 
a multilayered story, she summarises matters thus: 
By the mid-1950s adversarial party politics had noisily played out over several 
electoral and constitutional issues: the weighting of votes, especially considering rural 
and urban voters; the extent to which electorate sizes might vary in order to respect 
communities of interest; and the composition of the Representation Commission. 
Given the recent history of seesaw politics over these electoral issues, each side of 
politics could rightly fear the actions of their opponents when the other side regained 
political power. 
 
Faced with these incentives, New Zealand’s political actors agreed in 1956 to bind themselves 
to the mast by first compromising on rules to govern those matters they disagreed on, and then 
reserving those compromise rules from amendment by a future bare parliamentary majority. 
The majority of McLeay’s book is devoted to uncovering and presenting for the reader the 
politics and processes involved in this move. In the book’s last two chapters, however, McLeay 
charts the evolution of this second aspect of the political response. Originally, the manner and 
form requirements were assumed by those who created them to impose no more than a politico-
moral impediment to change, on the basis that “it was generally believed that that the courts 
would not want to become involved if entrenched clauses were not respected by a future House 
of Representatives”. Despite its assumed legally unenforceable status, the impediment 
nonetheless was uniformly respected, with no Parliament seeking to change a reserved 
provision other than in accordance with the mandated processes in the subsequent sixty-plus 
years. And McLeay convincingly argues that the example laid down in 1956 has contributed 
to a more general constitutional expectation that major changes to other, non-reserved matters 
of electoral law only will take occur if there is more than bare majority support in the House. 
 
However, the original constitutional assumption that courts would have no role in ensuring the 
manner and form provisions were adhered to was slowly abandoned, replaced with a view that 
adherence to such requirements is a judicially enforceable prior condition for valid 
parliamentary lawmaking. Or, as the Supreme Court recently noted, “the pendulum has swung 
in favour of enforceability.” (Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 123 at [70]). Exactly how 
the underlying constitutional assumptions came to rotate a full 180 degrees over half a century 
is something about which McLeay has a little less to say. She does generally suggest that “the 
interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty can differ, often quite subtly, through time, and it 
stimulates much debate and discussion.” While this is true, and while McLeay does point to 
other developments such as “Maori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 and human rights 
generally”, she presents no particularly fleshed out account of the development. There thus 
remains a further story to be told about just why and how the originally non-legally binding 
parliamentary innovation introduced in 1956 came to be considered a hard-law procedural 
constraint on legislative competence enforceable in the courts. 
 
I conclude this review with a note for comparativist scholars. On McLeay’s account, in the 
1950’s New Zealand’s political actors had tip-toed up to the edge of a precipice. Each side of 
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politics had taken turns in trying to screw the electoral scrum in their own favour. As McLeay 
notes, the response was to jointly agree not to do this anymore. But this was not the only 
response available. Another would have been to try and screw the electoral scrum even more, 
in order to entrench current electoral advantage and ensure their opponents would not have an 
opportunity to act likewise. We have seen the consequences of this approach in the 
contemporary in the United States, where nakedly partisan gerrymandering, voter suppression 
and politically appointed administrators are widespread (and, bizarrely, widely accepted) in the 
electoral process. 
 
Had those responsible for the Electoral Act 1956 not chosen to step away from the precipice 
and make a collective decision to remove the temptation to seek partisan advantage in changing 
electoral law, New Zealand too may have plunged into this abyss. McLeay notes that this 
decision was driven by more than simple recognition of mutual danger. She references shared 
political values of consensual decision making and government responsiveness as 
underpinning a constitutional culture that saw such behaviour as quite simply wrong. That 
cultural commitment, and the actions of those who were guided by it, has helped to preserve 
New Zealand’s strong democratic institutions and fostered a more general ethos of 
constitutional care amongst political actors. We are, as a country, the better for it. 
 
 
 
1 Somewhat strangely, McLeay’s book mentions this litigation trial only once (p. 88) – and then to 
misstate the outcome of one of the cases in question. She states “the Court of Appeal found against 
the appellant on the grounds that the [prisoner] disqualification did not infringe his rights under the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990.” In fact, the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion. See Attorney-
General v Taylor [2017] NZCA 215. 
                                     
